Foreword

Mr. Andris Piebalgs  - EU Commissioner to Energy

Introduction

Section I : Political Energy Relations Between EU and Russia

Chapter I: EU-Russia Energy Dialogue at the Origin of the European Foreign Energy Policy

1.Introduction
2.Objectives and Functioning of the EU – Russia Energy Dialogue
A.Objectives
B.Other energy dialogues
C.Functioning
1.The Permanent Partnership Council (PPC)
2.The coordinators
3.Working groups
3.Progress Achieved Under the Energy Dialogue
4.Main Elements of the Energy Dialogue
A.Investment
B.Markets
C.Infrastructure
D.Energy efficiency
E.Early Warning Mechanism
5.Future of the Dialogue
6.Conclusion

Mr. Ferran Tarradellas - Spokesman of the Energy Commissioner

Chapter II: The Politics of EU – Russia Energy Relations

1.Introduction
2.Russian Energy Policy
3.Ukraine
4.EU Energy Policy
5.Conclusion

Dr. Fraser Cameron

Section II: Legal Aspects of EU - Russia Energy Relations

Chapter I: A Common Russia – EU Energy Space (The New EU – Russia Partnership Agreement, Acquis Communautaire, The Energy Charter and the New Russian Initiative)

1.Introduction
2.First Option: Export of the Acquis communautaire (the EU’s Preferred Approach but a “no go” For           Russia)
A.“Direct” expansion of the ‘acquis’ area
B.“Indirect” expansion of the ‘acquis’ area
3.Second Option: A New bilateral Treaty
4.Third Option: a New PA Energy Chapter Based on the 1994 ECT
A.Russia and the ECT
B.The EU and the ECT
5.The Energy Charter and Consequences of the Recent Russia-Ukraine Gas Dispute (Role of the Energy           Charter Secretariat)
6.New Russian Energy Initiative and the Energy Сharter
A.Russia is bound by the ECT
B.Consequences of withdrawal from the ECT
C.Transit: common fallacy
D.Destroy or renew
7.Practical Actions for Moving Forward
8.Russia Between Two Margins: to Lead Energy Charter Process “Plus” – or to Withdraw From ECT             Provisional Application?
A.Disadvantages resulting from withdrawal
B.Energy Charter process “plus”
C.Road map within Energy Charter “plus” scenario
D.Package solution
9.Unfortunate Development - and its Consequences

Dr. Andrei Konoplyanik

Chapter II: EU- Russia Relations in the Energy Field: The Continuing Role of International Law

1.Context
2.Energy and Sovereignty
3.The EU’s House-Keeping Matters
4. Avenues in International Law
A.Contractual provisions
B.Treaties and public international law
C. Russia’s provisional application
D.Opting Out
E.The ‘domestic exception’ clause in Article 45
F.Scope of provisional application: time and relationship   to substantive ECT provisions
G.Treaties and Russian law
H.The rule of law in the ECT
I.The way forward
5.Conclusion

Mrs. Sophie Nappert - Arbitrator

Chapter III: Arbitrating Disputes Under the Energy Charter Treaty

1.Introduction
2.Overview of the Energy Charter Treaty
A.Background
B.Investment promotion and protection
C.Dispute settlement
3.Investment Protection
A.Introduction
B.Scope of protection
C.Minimum standard of investment protection – Article 10(1)
1.Fair and equitable treatment
2.Most constant protection and security
3.Discrimination
4.Umbrella clause
D.Most favoured nation treatment
E.Article 13 – Expropriation
F.Article 17 – Non-application of Part III in Certain Circumstances
4.Settlement of Disputes between an Investor and a Contracting Party
A.Introduction
B.Amicable settlement
C.The investor’s choice of forum for dispute resolution
D.Applicable law
E.Local companies controlled by foreign investors
5.Provisional Application of the ECT
A.Provisional application of treaty obligations
B.The relationship between international law and municipal law
C.Termination and opting out of provisional of the ECT
6.Awards Rendered
A.Brief introduction to the cases
1.Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v. the Republic of Latvia
2.Petrobart Limited v. the Kyrgyz Republic
3.Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria (ICSID case no. ARB/03/24)
4.Amto v. Ukraine
5.Ioannis Kardassopoulos v. Georgia (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18) - Decision on jurisdiction                 B.Jurisdictional issues
1.Nykomb
(a)Investment
(b)Retroactive Application
2.Petrobart
(a)Investment
(b)Applicability of the ECT with regard to Gibraltar
(c)Article 17 ECT
(d)Res Judicata
3.Plama
(a)Burden of proof
(b)Investment
(c)Article 17 ECT
4.Amto
(a)Investment
(b)Article 17 ECT
5.Kardassopoulos
(a)Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae
(b)Provisional application
6.Concluding remarks on jurisdiction
(a)Article 17 ECT
(b)Provisional application
(c)Investment
C.Compensation standards
1.Nykomb
2.Petrobart
3.Concluding remarks regarding compensation
7.Concluding Remarks

Dr. Kaj Hober - Arbitrator - Mannheimer Swartling

Chapter IV: Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Russia: Improving, but Still Uncertain

1.Introduction
2.The Russian Legal System has Generally Demonstrated a “Two Steps Forward, One Step Back”           Approach to Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards under the New York Convenition               
3.Examining Russia’s Nascent Pro-Enforcement Trend Through the Application of Three Oft-Cited              Grounds for Refusal Highlights the Domestic Courts’ Internal Struggle
A.Non-arbitrability of the underlying dispute
B.Lack of sufficient notice
C.Arbitration awards as contrary to Russian public policy
4.Conclusion

Mark Baker, Jonathan Sutcliffe , Kirsten Hetzel Wilson and Kinan H. Romman - Fulbright & Jaworski

Chapter V: The Effect of the EC – Russia Partnership Agreement in Community Law: Lessons Learned From the Soccer World

1.Introduction
A.The EC-Russia Partnership Agreement
B.Partnership Agreements as an instrument of EC external policy
2.The Effect of International Agreements in the Community Legal Order
3.Direct Effect of the EC-Russia Partnership Agreement
4.From Professional Football to Energy Relations
5.Relevance for a New EC-Russia Bilateral Agreement
A.Lessons learned from Simutenkov
B.Implications for an energy chapter in the future agreement
1.Rules modelled on EC law
2.Rules not modelled on EC law
6.Conclusion

Dr. Dirk Buschle - Legal Counsel Energy Community Secretariat

Section III: Changing the Rules for the EU Natural Gas Markets - From State to Market and Plan to
                    Contract

Chapter I: The New EU Energy Policy and Implications for Former Soviet Union Natural Gas Suppliers

1.Introduction
2.Changes in the Regulation of the EU Internal Market in Natural Gas
3.Natural Gas Pipeline Projects from the Caspian Region
A.Inconsistent rule of law
B.Resource base
4.New Energy Strategy - Second Strategic Energy Review
5.Conclusion

Dr. Dmitry Volkov, Dr. Gürcan Gülen and Dr. Michelle Michot Foss - Centre for Energy Economist, Austin University - Texas.

Chapter II: Unbundling as a Defence Mechanism Against Russia: Is the EU Missing the Point?

1.Introduction
2.Challenging Unbundling and the Third Country Clause Under the EC Treaty
A.Is the EU competent to require unbundling?
1.Article 95 cannot be used to address potential behaviour
       2.Unbundling requirements are inconsistent with the principle of subsidiarity and                                proportionality
B.Can the EU restrict the free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment?
1.Unbundling and the third country clause violate the free movement of capital and the                                  freedom of establishment
2.These violations cannot be covered by any exceptions
3.Challenging Unbundling and the Third Country Clause Under BITs and the ECT
A.Claiming compensation under a BIT 
B.Claiming compensation under the ECT
4.Concluding Remarks – Enforceability and Bilateral Relations
A.Enforceability
B.EU-Russia bilateral energy relations

Arnoud Willems, Jung-ui Sul and Yohan Benizri - Sidley Austin LLP

Chapter III: The Long-Term Capacity Agreements, Third Party Access and EU-Russia Relations

1.Introduction
2.Access to Import and Transit Pipelines Under EU Law
3.Secondary EC Law and Third Party Access in the Gas Sector
A.The gas market Directive
B.The access Regulation
1.Tariffs
2.Third party access services
3.Exemptions from TPA – new infrastructure
4.TPA and EC Competition Law
A.Article 82 and TPA
1.Refusal to deal
2.The essential facility doctrine
3.Refusal to deal – access to pipelines
(a) There must be a refusal to deal
       (b) There are two distinct markets and the requested company has a dominant                                                    position in the upstream market
                                     (c) The input is essential and indispensable for competition in the downstream market
                                     (d) Refusal leads to total elimination of competition
                                     (e) In case of IP rights, there is a requirement of “new product”
                                     (f) There is no objective justification for the refusal
B.Some reflections
5.Relationship Between General Competition Laws And Sector-Specific Energy Regulation
A.The relationship – possible approaches
B.The European Court of Justice
C.Application of the two regimes
6.TPA and EU-Russia Relations – The Right of First Refusal
7.Conclusion

Kim Talus and Michaël Hunt - University College London and scientific collaborator Université catholique de Louvain

Chapter IV: Russian Energy Strategy and Transit Routes in Eastern Europe – A View From Warsaw

1.Introduction
2.Poland’s Energy Policy
A.Poland’s energy security
B.Tensions on the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline
C.Russian Polish transit disputes in Europolgaz
3.Poland’s Perceptions of the Russian Energy Policy
A.Perceptions of the Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes
B.Perceptions of the Russian-German energy cooperation
4.New Energy Alliances in Eastern Europe
A.Amber Stream
B.Baltic Pipe
C.Developments on the Druzhba Pipeline
D.Odessa-Brody oil pipeline
E.Mazeikiu refinery
F.Ignalin nuclear plant
5.Conclusions

Mr. Alexander Kotlowski - Oxford University

Chapter V: Can Nordstream and Southstream Survive in a Changing European Gas Market?

1.Introduction
2.Nordstream
3.Southstream
4.A Changing European Gas Market
A.Market liberalization
B.Unconventional gas and LNG
C.Gazprom and the economic crisis.
5.Conclusion

Prof. Alan Riley - City University London

Chapter VI: The 2009 Gas Conflict and its Consequences for  European Energy Security

1.Introduction
2.Russia: Energy and Financial Background Prior to the Crisis
A.       The need to “sweep under the carpet” an external business conflict caused by a corporate                                   problem of a current gas deficit 
B.       Gazprom’s shortage of energy and financial resources
1.Estimate of the current deficit of Gazprom’s resources during the consumption peak in                                       the period of  January 1-20, 2009
2.The critical financial standing of Gazprom caused by debts and the price downturn on                                       the main market in the EU
3.Russia: Political and Economic Considerations Behind Unleashing the Crisis
A.Articulated political and economic considerations
B.Russia was also pursuing non-articulated goals
4.Ukraine: Allegations vs Reality
5.Prospects of Gas Transit via Ukraine
6.The Gas Crisis as a “Mirror” of Energy Vulnerability of the EU
7.Resolution of the Crisis and its Consequences
8.Proposals for Enhancement of European Energy Security
9.Conclusive Remarks

Michael Gonchar, Vitalii Martyniuk and Olena Prystayko - Centre for Global Studies - EU Russia Centre Brussels

__________________________________________________________________________

Publication date: December 2009 Publication price: 110 EUR
Format: 17 x 24.5 cm      Order this Title: [Click to Order]



EU - Russia Energy Relations
Legal and Policy Issues
OGEL